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Tariffs and Privatization Policy in a Bilateral Trade Model with 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Lili Xu* and Sang-Ho Lee**  
Abstract 
This paper considers an international bilateral trade model with corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
examines the strategic interaction between tariffs and privatization policy. We demonstrate that strategic tariff in 
a private market is higher than that in a mixed market, while efficient tariff in a private market is lower than that 
in a mixed market. We then show that privatization policy raises strategic tariff and worsens (improves) domestic 
welfare when the degree of CSR is low (high). Further, we investigate endogenous choice of privatization policy 
and demonstrate that both the countries choose nationalization policy even though privatization policy is globally 
optimal when the degree of CSR is high. This indicates the existence of a prisoner’s dilemma in choosing 
privatization policy in a bilateral trade model with higher CSR.  
Keywords: Bilateral trade, Corporate social responsibility, Privatization, Tariff Policy 
JEL Classifications: D43, F12, F31, L13, L33 
1. Introduction 
In the last few decades, many developed and developing countries have continued to reform and 
privatize their state-owned public firms under the global trend of trade liberalization, but the public 
firms are still significant players and control large portions of the world’s resources.1 In particular, they 
are strongly concentrated in a few strategic sectors such as finance, steel, manufacture, transportation, 
telecommunications, power generation, electricity, and other energy industries. Further, in these 
industries, the public firms compete with domestic and foreign private firms in mixed markets. 
Many researchers in the field of industrial organization, international trade, and development 
economics have studied the privatization of public firms and explored how foreign competition affects 
the desire to privatize in mixed markets. Several studies have also analyzed import tariff and 
privatization policy in an international mixed market. For example, in a seminal research on the 
interaction between privatization and strategic trade policies, Pal and White (1998) found that 
privatization could increase welfare if import tariff is used. Pal and White (2003) also demonstrated 
                                       
* Lecturer, Department of Economics and Trade, Dalian Maritime University, China. lilixuchonnam@hotmail.com.  
** Professor, Department of Economics, Chonnam National University, Korea. sangho@jnu.ac.kr. 
1 According to Barca and Becht (2001), OECD (2004), and Kowalski et al. (2013), among the largest state-owned public 
firms in the OECD countries, over 10% public firms have significant government ownership and their sales are equivalent to 
approximately 6% of the world GDP.  
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that the existence of public firms lowers optimal tariffs and the total volume of trade between two 
countries, which does not indicate lower levels of welfare for the trading countries. Chang (2005) argued 
that the decision to privatize depends crucially on the strategic substitutability-complementarity while 
Chang (2007), Yu and Lee (2011) and Han (2012) reported that privatization strategy is affected 
strongly by trade instruments and cost differences between firms. Chao and Yu (2006) also found that 
foreign competition lowers the optimal tariff rate, but privatization policy raises it. Wang et al. (2014) 
examined privatization policy and foreign entry, and demonstrated that domestic entry might be socially 
excessive whether it is free trade or the domestic government imposing a tariff policy.  
Some studies have also explored the relationship between privatization and trade policies in an 
international trade framework in which public firms compete with domestic and foreign firms either in 
the third country or in both home and foreign countries. Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2005) considered 
an international integrated mixed market with two countries and demonstrated that only one government 
privatizes its public firms and that government indicates lower social welfare at equilibrium. Dadpay 
and Heywood (2006) found that two competing, domestic and foreign (public) firms play the role of 
trade barriers and the strategic interaction of the two governments usually reduces welfare. On the other 
hand, considering a bilateral trade framework in which both public and private firms compete in both 
home and foreign countries, Han and Ogawa (2008), Lee et al. (2013), Xu and Lee (2015) and Xu et al. 
(2016) examined the interaction of two countries in terms of strategic choices of privatization policy 
and import tariff. They demonstrated that the privatization policy depends not only on the relative 
efficiency of the public firm, but also on the choice of trade policy. 
However, traditional economic theories commonly view profit maximization as the sole objective 
of a private firm. Porter and Kramer (2006) present a systematic analysis linking comparative advantage 
to CSR, which has now become a mainstream global business strategy.2 Furthermore, while a large 
number of firms in the world issue various CSR statements/activities, many of them belong to industries 
characterized as mixed oligopolies in which CSR firms compete with public firms.  
Recent works on oligopoly markets have analyzed different forms of market competition wherein 
profit-maximizing private firms compete with other private firms that adopt CSR activities. 3 For 
example, Wang et al. (2012) considered an international market under imperfect competition and 
explored the strategic tariff policy and welfare consequences of foreign firms adopting CSR. Chang et 
al. (2014) extended their work to examine the welfare implications of CSR and demonstrated the 
                                       
2 According to KPMG (2008, 2013), nearly 80% of the 250 largest companies worldwide issued CSR reports in 2008 and 
more than 30% (71% and 90%) of companies in the US (the UK and Japan, respectively) adopted CSR in 2013.  
3 As regards the recent research on CSR under oligopolistic competition, see Kopel and Brand (2012), Nakamura (2014), 
Matsumura and Ogawa (2014), Kopel (2015), Lambertini and Tampieri (2015), Manasakis et al. (2017), and Kim et al. (2017) 
among others. 
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feasibility of moving toward tariff reduction when both domestic and foreign firms adopt CSR 
initiatives. 
In this paper, we consider an international bilateral trade model in which a domestic public firm 
competes with both domestic and foreign private firms with CSR initiatives. We focus on the intra-
industry trade and examine the strategic interaction of two countries’ optimal choices of tariffs and 
privatization policies. Our analysis has three different scenarios. 
In the first scenario, we analyze a private market under a privatization policy in both the countries 
and demonstrate that tariff policy has an entry-reducing effect and thus, strategic tariff is positive and 
decreasing in the degree of CSR in a private market. We also demonstrate that strategic tariff is higher 
(lower) than efficient tariff when the degree of CSR is low (high). 
In the second scenario, we analyze a mixed market under a nationalization policy in both the 
countries and demonstrate that the tariff policy is substitutable for the public firm, but strategic tariff is 
increasing first and then decreasing in the degree of CSR. We also demonstrate that strategic tariff is 
higher (lower) than the efficient tariff when the degree of CSR is low (high).  
Furthermore, we compare these two different scenarios between a private market and a mixed 
market. We demonstrate that strategic tariff in a private market is higher than that in a mixed market, 
while efficient tariff in a private market is lower than that in a mixed market. Thus, privatization will 
raise strategic tariff and worsen (improve) domestic welfare when the degree of CSR is low (high). 
In the third scenario, we investigate an asymmetric choice of privatization policy by the two 
countries and demonstrate that strategic tariff in a country with a mixed market is lower than that in a 
country with a private market. We also demonstrate that strategic tariff is higher (low) than efficient 
tariff when the degree of CSR is low (high) in both the markets.  
Finally, we integrate these three cases in a super game and analyze it with an endogenous choice of 
privatization policy between the two countries. We demonstrate that both countries endogenously 
choose nationalization policy even though privatization policy is globally optimal when the degree of 
CSR is high. This finding suggests that there is a prisoner’s dilemma problem in the endogenous 
privatization choice game in the presence of higher CSR. Therefore, an appropriate regulatory 
framework in both countries is necessary for a higher degree of CSR in international bilateral trade. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic bilateral trade model with CSR. In 
Section 3, we analyze market equilibrium in private and mixed markets. In Section 4, we compare tariffs 
and welfares. In Section 5, we examine an endogenous choice game of privatization policy. The final 
section concludes the paper. 
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2. The Model 
Suppose that there are two countries, 1 and 2, with a state-owned public firm and a consumer-friendly 
private firm coexisting in each of them. We define a consumer-friendly private firm as a profit-oriented 
private firm with a concern for consumer surplus as a CSR.4 Both firms produce homogeneous products 
in each country and may export them to the other country. We denote the state-owned public firm’s 
output in home country i as 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hi  and its exports as 𝑞𝑞
𝑠𝑠
ei . Similarly, 𝑞𝑞
𝑐𝑐
hiand 𝑞𝑞
𝑐𝑐
ei  are the CSR-
oriented firm’s output and exports, respectively, in home country i=1,2.  
The government in each country can impose a tariff on the imports that are produced by both the 
public and the CSR-oriented firms in the other country, where the import tariff is denoted by 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 for 
country i. The import tariff revenue is denoted by 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ej + 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ej) in country i.  
Total market outputs in country i is denoted by 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hi + 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ej + 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐hi + 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ej . The inverse 
demand function is assumed to be symmetric and identical, given by: 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 1 − 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 where the market 
price in country i is denoted by 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖. Then, consumer surplus is denoted by CS𝑖𝑖 = 12𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖2. 
The cost functions of both the firms in each country is assumed to be identical and quadratic, given 
by C(𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥hi + 𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥ei) = 12 (𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥hi + 𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥ei)2, where x = s, c. Then, the profit of the firm is as follows: 
𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥i = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥hi + (𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 − 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗)𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥ei − 12 (𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥hi + 𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥ei)2 .                                (1) 
The domestic welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus, industry profits, and import tariff 
revenues: 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 = CS𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠i + 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐i + 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 .                                                (2) 
The state-owned public firm is assumed to maximize the domestic welfare, while the CSR-oriented firm 
considers both its own profit and consumer surplus of the two countries. In specific, we assume that the 
objective function of the CSR-oriented firms is as follows: 
𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐i = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(CS𝑖𝑖 + CS𝑗𝑗) + 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐i ,                                                (3) 
where 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 represents the degree of CSR of the firm in country i, which is exogenously given as 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ∈[0,1]. That is, CSR-initiative implies that the private firm adopts consumer surplus as a proxy for its 
own CSR concerns. Then, a CSR-related incentive combines both profitability and consumer surplus 
as a convex combination formula. Thus, when a private firm engaged in CSR or altruistic concern places 
                                       
4 The recent emergence of consumer-friendly private firms in international competition is discussed and analyzed by Chang 
et al. (2014) and Wang et al. (2012). 
5 
 
a weight on consumer surplus in its objective function, it is analogous to assuming that the firm places 
a higher weight on output. Here, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 0 indicates a pure profit-maximizing private firm.5 
3. Market Equilibrium 
 
3.1 Private Market 
We consider a private market in both the countries where the public firm is fully privatized. Thus, there 
is a private firm and a CSR-oriented firm in each country. Assuming positive outputs, the first-order 
conditions of the two private and the two CSR-oriented firms in the two markets, in which the privatized 
firm maximizes (1) and the CSR firm maximizes (3), yields the following equilibrium outputs:6 
𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hi = 13 (1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 − 4−𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗7−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖−𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 + 3(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗)5−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖−𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗), 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐hi = 13 (1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 − (4−𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗)(1−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)7−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖−𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 + 3(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗)(1−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)5−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖−𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 ), 
𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ei = 13 (1 − 2𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 − 4−𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗7−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖−𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 − 3(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗)5−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖−𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗), 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ei = 13 (1 − 2𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 − �4−𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗�(1−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)7−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖−𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 − 3(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗)(1−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)5−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖−𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 ). 
Then, we have that 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝑥𝑥
hi
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
> 0, but 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥ei
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
< 0, 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥hi
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
< 0, and 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥ei
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
< 0, where x = s, c. This implies 
that in a private market, imposing a higher tariff in the home country will increase its domestic output, 
but reduce the domestic output and exports of the foreign country. Thus, tariff policy has an entry-
reducing effect, which causes an output substitution effect between the domestic and foreign products 
in both the private markets.  
Thus, total market output and price are given by: 
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 4−𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗7−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖−𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 − 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗5−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖−𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 1 − 4−𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗7−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖−𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 + 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗5−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖−𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗. 
Note that 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
< 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
> 0. Thus, due to the output substitution effect, imposing tariff will reduce 
total market output in the home country, while raising it in the foreign country.  
3.2 Mixed Market 
We consider a mixed market in both the countries where the private firm is fully nationalized. Thus, 
there is a state-owned public firm and a CSR-oriented firm in each country. Assuming positive output 
                                       
5 Many theoretical papers have examined the altruistic perspective of CSR. For example, Wang et al. (2012) and Chang et al. 
(2014) compared the binary choice of CSR between 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 0 or 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 1, while Nakamura (2014), Kopel (2015), Matsumura 
and Ogawa (2014, 2016), and Kim et al. (2017) analyzed the optimal choice of CSR, that is, 0 < 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 1. 
6 Note that the sufficient conditions for positive outputs and prices are 2𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 − (5 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 − 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗)(3 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 − 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗) < 2𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(6 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 − 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗) <4�6 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 − 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗� − 2(2 − 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗), which are satisfied at equilibrium. 
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except the public firm’s exports, the first-order conditions of the two public and the two CSR-oriented 
firms in the two markets, in which the public firm maximizes (2) and the CSR-firm maximizes (3) yields 
the following equilibrium outputs:7 
𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hi = 2(2𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗)2+6(10−7𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖−4𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗)−𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(1−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)(15−4𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖−2𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗)−𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗(15−2𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖�1−𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗�−(10−𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗)𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗)3(2𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖2+�3−𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗��15−2𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗�−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(21−5𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗)) , 
𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐hi = 15+21𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖−10𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖2−(15+𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗+2𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗2+2𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(1−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)(15−4𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖−2𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗)+2𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗(15−2𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖−2(5−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗+𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗2)3(2𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖2+�3−𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗��15−2𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗�−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(21−5𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗)) , 
𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ei = 15(1+𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)−9𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗−𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(1−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)(15−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖−2𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗)−(4𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖−𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗)(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+2𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗)+2𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(4−𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗)−(6−𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗)(5−2𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗))3(2𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖2+�3−𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗��15−2𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗�−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(21−5𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗)) . 
Then, we have that 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝑠𝑠
ei
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘
< 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hi
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘
< 0, but 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐hi
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘
> 0 where k = s, c. This implies that in a mixed 
market imposing a higher tariff will not only reduce export from the foreign country, but also the output 
of the public firm. This, in turn, will increase the output of the CSR-oriented firm. Thus, tariff policy in 
a mixed market has an entry-reducing effect and output substitution effect between the public firm and 
the CSR-oriented firm. This implies that tariff policy is substitutable with the output of the public firm, 
but the substitutability depends on the degree of CSR.  
Total market outputs and price are: 
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 5(2−𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖)(3−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)−2(4−𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗)𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗2𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖2+�3−𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗��15−2𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗�−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(21−5𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗) and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = (3−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)(5+5𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−2𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)−(13+2𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+2𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗−5𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗+2𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗22𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖2+(−3+𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗)(−15+2𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗)+𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(−21+5𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗) . 
Note that 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
< 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
> 0. This implies that imposing tariff will reduce domestic total market 
outputs while it will raise the foreign country’s total market outputs. 
4. Tariffs and Welfares 
In the following, for the sake of analytic convenience, we consider the symmetric case of the CSR-
oriented firms in both the countries having the same degree of CSR, i.e., 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼 and then, find 
the optimal tariff policies in each model. 
4.1 Private Market 
                                       
7 Appendix (i) demonstrates that a state-owned public firm does not export at equilibrium, i.e., 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ei = 0. This is because 
𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hi > 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐hi + 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ei when 0 < 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 1. It indicates that the public firm produces more output than the CSR-oriented firm and thus, 
its marginal cost is higher than that of the CSR-oriented firm. Thus, as explained in Melitz (2003), Helpman et al. (2004), and 
Lee et al. (2013), the exposure to trade will induce only the more productive private firm to enter the export market, and the 
less productive public firm will continue to produce only for the domestic market. Note that the sufficient conditions for 
positive outputs and prices are 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(11− 5𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗) − 15 − 2𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗(13 + 2𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 − 2𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗) < 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(15 − 5𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 − 2𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗) < 30 − 10𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 − 2(4 − 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗)𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 , 
which are satisfied at equilibrium. 
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Using the market equilibrium in a private market, the government of each country will independently 
and simultaneously set its optimal tariff to maximize domestic welfare in (2), which can be described 
as follows: 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃 = 1
18
�2 �8 − 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗�8 − 11𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗� − 6𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗�� + 9(9−4𝛼𝛼)�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗�2(5−2𝛼𝛼)2 + �25−4𝛼𝛼(1+𝛼𝛼)��4−𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗�2(7−2𝛼𝛼)2 −
9�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗��4+(5−2𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−(9−2𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗�
5−2𝛼𝛼
−
�4−𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗��4(8−𝛼𝛼)+(−39+6𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+(−7+2𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗�
7−2𝛼𝛼
�. 
The first-order condition for the maximization of 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 with respect to 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 in each country provides 
the following reaction function: 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝜕𝜕(5−2𝛼𝛼)�219−267𝛼𝛼+116𝛼𝛼2−20𝛼𝛼3�+�358−411𝛼𝛼+180𝛼𝛼2−28𝛼𝛼3�𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗2(3314−4737𝛼𝛼+2521𝛼𝛼2−592𝛼𝛼3+52𝛼𝛼4) . 
Note that strategic tariff policies between the two countries are strategic complements, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
> 0. 
We have the following equilibrium import tariff: 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃∗ = 219−𝛼𝛼(267−4𝛼𝛼(29−5𝛼𝛼))
1254−𝛼𝛼(1311−448𝛼𝛼+52𝛼𝛼2). 
Note that 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃∗ > 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃∗𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 < 0 when 𝑎𝑎 ∈ [0,1]. Then, we have Lemma 1 as follows. 
LEMMA 1. In a private market, strategic tariff is positive and decreasing in 𝛼𝛼. 
In a private market, strategic tariff is positive and thus it will reduce the export of the firms in the foreign 
country, but it is decreasing as the degree of CSR increases. This is because there is a business-stealing 
effect from the firm in the foreign country and thus, with regard to domestic welfare, each country’s 
government will strategically set a positive tariff to lessen the business-stealing effect, which decreases 
as the degree of CSR of the firm increases. Thus, from the viewpoint of domestic welfare, CSR activities 
substitute strategic tariff. 
Then, we have the following equilibrium outputs: 
 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hi = 273−4𝛼𝛼(91−40𝛼𝛼+6𝛼𝛼2)1254−𝛼𝛼(1311−448𝛼𝛼+52𝛼𝛼2), 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ei = 54−𝛼𝛼(97−4(11−𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼)1254−𝛼𝛼(1311−448𝛼𝛼+52𝛼𝛼2), 
 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐hi = 273−2𝛼𝛼(73+𝛼𝛼−2𝛼𝛼2)1254−𝛼𝛼(1311−448𝛼𝛼+52𝛼𝛼2), 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ei = 54−𝛼𝛼(121−2(59−12𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼)1254−𝛼𝛼(1311−448𝛼𝛼+52𝛼𝛼2). 
Note that 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hi + 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ei < 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐hi + 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ei. That is, the output of the private firm is lower than that of the 
CSR-oriented firm at equilibrium. The total market output and price are given by: 
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𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃∗ = 654−6(81−14𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼
1254−𝛼𝛼(1311−448𝛼𝛼+52𝛼𝛼2) and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃∗ = (5−2𝛼𝛼)(120−117𝛼𝛼+26𝛼𝛼2)1254−𝛼𝛼(1311−448𝛼𝛼+52𝛼𝛼2). 
Finally, the maximized social welfare of each country is: 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃∗ = (109−𝛼𝛼(81−14𝛼𝛼))(4581−𝛼𝛼(5679−2𝛼𝛼(937+6𝛼𝛼−28𝛼𝛼2)))(1254−𝛼𝛼(1311−448𝛼𝛼+52𝛼𝛼2))2 . 
We can define global welfare as the sum of domestic welfare in a private market, that is, 𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃 = 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 +
𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗
𝑃𝑃. Then, we can compare strategic tariff with efficient tariff, which maximizes global welfare. The 
first-order condition for the maximization of 𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃 with respect to it  yields the efficient import tariff: 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 18𝛼𝛼+8𝛼𝛼2−9
27+4𝛼𝛼2
. 
Note that 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
<
>
0 when 𝑎𝑎 <
>
 0.42, and 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼
> 0. Then we have Lemma 2 as follows. 
LEMMA 2. In a private market, efficient tariff is negative (positive) when 𝛼𝛼 is low (high), and it is 
increasing in 𝛼𝛼. 
In a private market, efficient tariff depends on the degree of CSR. This implies that free trade policy is 
not always the best policy in a private market. When the degree of CSR is low, it becomes a subsidy to 
remedy under-production under imperfect competition. However, when the degree of CSR is high, it 
should be positive to reduce the over-production effect of the CSR-oriented firm. Thus, from the 
viewpoint of global welfare, efficient tariff is complementary with CSR activities. 
Finally, domestic welfare in each country and global welfare under efficient tariff are as follows: 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 9
27+4𝛼𝛼2
 and 𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 18
27+4𝛼𝛼2
. 
PROPOSITION 1. In a private market, strategic tariff is higher (lower) than efficient tariff when the 
degree of CSR is low (high). 
Proof: Comparing the results in a private market, we have: 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 ≥ 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃  when 0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 0.59, and 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃 ≤ 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 when 0.59 ≤ 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 1. 
Proposition 1 implies that in a private market, the degree of CSR will affect the relative efficiency of 
the strategic tariff. When the degree of CSR is very low, the strategic tariff is positive and the efficiency 
tariff is negative. However, as the degree of CSR increases, strategic tariff becomes substitutable and 
thus, decreasing, while efficient tariff becomes complementary and thus, increasing. As such, when the 
degree of CSR is high, the strategic tariff is lower than the efficiency tariff. 
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4.2 Mixed Market 
Using the market equilibrium in a mixed market, the government of each country will independently 
and simultaneously set its optimal tariff to maximize domestic welfare in (2), which can be described 
as follows: 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀 = 1
18(5−3𝛼𝛼)2(−3+𝛼𝛼)2 {4(5 − 3𝛼𝛼)2(13 − 7𝛼𝛼 − 2𝛼𝛼2) − (1475 − 2620𝛼𝛼 + 1696𝛼𝛼2 − 472𝛼𝛼3 + 49𝛼𝛼4)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖2 − 2(5 −3𝛼𝛼)(35 − 64𝛼𝛼 + 5𝛼𝛼2 + 8𝛼𝛼3)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 + (1075 − 𝛼𝛼(6 − 𝛼𝛼)(350 − 178𝛼𝛼 + 35𝛼𝛼2)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗2 + 2𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�2(5 − 3𝛼𝛼)(20 − 21𝛼𝛼 + 5𝛼𝛼2 −2𝛼𝛼3) + (25 − 25𝛼𝛼 + 21𝛼𝛼2 − 3𝛼𝛼3 − 2𝛼𝛼4)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗�}. 
The first-order condition for the maximization of 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 with respect to it  in each country generates 
the following reaction function: 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 2(5−3𝛼𝛼)�20−21𝛼𝛼+5𝛼𝛼2−2𝛼𝛼3�+�25−25𝛼𝛼+21𝛼𝛼2−3𝛼𝛼3−2𝛼𝛼4�𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗(1475−2620𝛼𝛼+1696𝛼𝛼2−472𝛼𝛼3+49𝛼𝛼4) . 
Thus, strategic tariff policies between the two countries are also strategic complements, that is., 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
>0. The equilibrium import tariff is given by: 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀∗ = 40−2𝛼𝛼(21−5𝛼𝛼+2𝛼𝛼2)
290−𝛼𝛼(345−128𝛼𝛼+17𝛼𝛼2). 
Note that 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀∗ > 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀∗𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 ><0 when 𝑎𝑎 <>0.40. Then, we have Lemma 3 as follows. 
LEMMA 3. In a mixed market, strategic tariff is positive and first increasing, then decreasing in 𝛼𝛼. 
In a mixed market, strategic tariff is positive. Thus, it can be directly used to reduce the export of the 
foreign country’s firm, but its effect depends on the degree of CSR. Further, the government can also 
use the public firm indirectly to reduce the business-stealing effect of the foreign country’s firm. As 
regards the total market output, the public firm should produce more output, which will increase its 
production cost. Thus, the government will compare the relative effectiveness of the two policies on the 
public firm and the tariff to increase its domestic welfare. When CSR activities are low, tariff policy is 
more effective because the export from the foreign country’s firm is low and thus, a lower tariff does 
not lead to higher cost-saving by the public firm even though it will encourage more export from the 
foreign country’s firm. However, when CSR activities are high, tariff policy is less effective because 
the export from the foreign firm is high and increasing with a lower tariff, which will lead to higher 
cost-saving by the public firm. Thus, from the viewpoint of domestic welfare, strategic tariff has a 
nonlinear relationship with CSR activities.  
Then, we have the equilibrium outputs as follows: 
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𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hi = 2(2−𝛼𝛼)(30−𝛼𝛼(26−5𝛼𝛼))290−𝛼𝛼(345−128𝛼𝛼+17𝛼𝛼2), 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐hi = 50−𝛼𝛼(17+(16−3𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼)290−𝛼𝛼(345−128𝛼𝛼+17𝛼𝛼2), 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ei = 10−𝛼𝛼(25−(26−7𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼)290−𝛼𝛼(345−128𝛼𝛼+17𝛼𝛼2). 
Note that 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hi
>
<
𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐hi + 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ei when 𝛼𝛼 <>0.5. That is, the output of the public firm is higher (lower) than 
that of the CSR firm at equilibrium when the degree of CSR is lower (higher). The total market output 
and price are given by: 
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀∗ = 6(30−𝛼𝛼(26−5𝛼𝛼))
290−𝛼𝛼(345−128𝛼𝛼+17𝛼𝛼2) and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀∗ = 110−𝛼𝛼(189−(98−17𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼)290−𝛼𝛼(345−128𝛼𝛼+17𝛼𝛼2). 
Finally, the maximized social welfare of each country is: 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀∗ = 2(30−26𝛼𝛼+5𝛼𝛼2)(450−611𝛼𝛼+202𝛼𝛼2+11𝛼𝛼3−10𝛼𝛼4)(290−𝛼𝛼(345−128𝛼𝛼+17𝛼𝛼2))2 . 
Similarly, we can evaluate global welfare in a mixed market, 𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀 = 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 + 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀. The differentiation 
of 𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀 with respect to it  yields the efficient import tariff: 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃 = 1+5𝛼𝛼+4𝛼𝛼2
2(7−𝛼𝛼+𝛼𝛼2). 
Note that 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃 > 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 > 0 when 𝑎𝑎 ∈ [0,1]. Then, we have Lemma 4 as follows. 
LEMMA 4. In a mixed market, strategic tariff is always positive and increasing in 𝛼𝛼. 
In a mixed market, efficient tariff depends on the degree of CSR. Again, free trade policy is not always 
the best policy in a mixed market. As the degree of CSR increases, efficient tariff increases to reduce 
the over-production effect of the CSR-oriented firm. Thus, efficient tariff in a mixed market is 
complementary with CSR activities. 
Finally, domestic welfare of each country and global welfare under efficient tariff is as follows: 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃 = 9
4(7−𝛼𝛼+𝛼𝛼2)  and 𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃 = 92(7−𝛼𝛼+𝛼𝛼2). 
PROPOSITION 2. In a mixed market, strategic tariff is higher (lower) than efficient tariff when the 
degree of CSR is low (high). 
Proof: Comparing the results in a mixed market, we have: 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀∗ ≥ 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃  when 0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 0.17, and 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀∗ ≤ 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃 when 0.17 ≤ 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 1. 
Proposition 2 implies that in a mixed market, the degree of CSR will affect the relative efficiency of the 
strategic tariff, but its effect is more significant than that in a private market. In particular, in a mixed 
market, when the degree of CSR is low, strategic tariff is higher than efficiency tariff, which is always 
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positive and does not require free trade or subsidization. However, when the degree of CSR is high, 
strategic tariff is lower than efficiency tariff because a higher CSR encourages over-production. 
4.3 Comparison 
We examine the effects of the privatization policy on strategic tariffs and social welfare when both the 
countries implement the privatization policy simultaneously. Figure 1 compares strategic tariff and 
efficient tariff in a private market and a mixed market, respectively. 
 
Figure 1. Comparisons of Tariffs in Private and Mixed Markets 
LEMMA 5. 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃∗ > 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀∗ and 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 < 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃 . 
It implies that strategic tariff in a private market is higher than that in a mixed market, while efficient 
tariff in a private market is lower than that in a mixed market. 
LEMMA 6. Comparing the strategic and efficient tariffs between private and mixed markets, we derive 
the following results: 
(i) When 0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 0.17, strategic tariffs are higher than efficient tariffs in both markets.  
(ii) When 0.17 ≤ 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 0.59, strategic tariff is lower than efficient tariff in a mixed market, while it is 
higher than efficient tariff in a private market.  
(iii) When 0.59 ≤ 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 1, strategic tariffs are lower than efficient tariffs in both markets. 
Proof: From Proposition 1 and 2, we have: 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀∗
>
<
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃  when 𝛼𝛼 <
>
0.17  and 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃∗ >< 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃  when 
𝛼𝛼
<
>
0.59. 
Figure 2 compares domestic welfare with strategic tariff and efficient tariff in a private market and a 
mixed market, respectively. 
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Figure 2. Comparisons of Welfare in Private and Mixed Markets 
PROPOSITION 3. Privatization policy in both the countries will raise strategic tariff and worsen 
(improves) domestic welfare when the degree of CSR is low (high). 
Proof: Using Figure 1 and Figure 2, we have that 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀∗
>
<
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃∗ when 𝛼𝛼 <
>
0.81. 
This indicates that privatization may be harmful to the society when a CSR firm engages in international 
trade. This is because privatization will eliminate the role of the public firm as an indirect instrument 
for reducing the business-stealing effect of the foreign country’s firm. Thus, privatization will induce 
an increase in strategic tariff, which might be higher or lower than efficient tariff depending on the 
degree of CSR. In particular, privatization may not be a welfare-improving policy if the degree of CSR 
is low. However, privatization improves welfare when the degree of CSR is high.  
5. Endogenous Choice of Privatization Policy 
In the previous subsection, we examined a symmetric choice of privatization policy, which can be 
implemented in both the countries simultaneously. In this section, we investigate the sequence of the 
privatization policy and determine whether coordination in privatization policy can improve social 
welfare. First, we examine an asymmetric choice of privatization policy in which one country has a 
private market and the other country has a mixed market. Then, we discuss the effects of asymmetric 
choice of strategic tariffs and social welfare. Finally, we find the equilibrium of the endogenous choice 
of privatization policy between the two countries. 
5.1 Asymmetric Choice of Privatization Policy 
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First, we examine an asymmetric case where country i has a mixed market and country j has a private 
market. Then, from the first-order conditions of the public and CSR firms in country i and the private 
and CSR firms in country j, we have the following equilibrium outputs:8 
𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hi = 2(2−𝛼𝛼)(15−7𝛼𝛼)−2(1−𝛼𝛼)(11−4𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−(17−(11−2𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗3(43−33𝛼𝛼+6𝛼𝛼2) , 
𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐hi = 9+(17−10𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼+4(1−𝛼𝛼)(11−4𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+(34−22𝛼𝛼+4𝛼𝛼2)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗3(43−33𝛼𝛼+6𝛼𝛼2) , 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ei = 24−𝛼𝛼(5+3𝛼𝛼)−2(1−𝛼𝛼)(13−3𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−(67−(41−6𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗3(43−33𝛼𝛼+6𝛼𝛼2) , 
𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hj = 6(2−𝛼𝛼)2+(17−3𝛼𝛼(9−2𝛼𝛼))𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+(19−6𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗3(43−33𝛼𝛼+6𝛼𝛼2) , 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ej = 9−𝛼𝛼(17−6𝛼𝛼)−2(3−𝛼𝛼)(7−6𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−(9−2𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗3(43−33𝛼𝛼+6𝛼𝛼2) , 
𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐hj = 24−𝛼𝛼(5+3𝛼𝛼)+(17−𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+(1−𝛼𝛼)(19−6𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗3(43−33𝛼𝛼+6𝛼𝛼2) , 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ej = 9+(17−10𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼−(42−6𝛼𝛼−4𝛼𝛼2)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−(1−𝛼𝛼)(9−2𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗3(43−33𝛼𝛼+6𝛼𝛼2) . 
It provides different interpretations of tariff policy to each country. From the viewpoint of country j, 
which has a private market, imposing a higher tariff will decrease exports of all firms in both the 
countries (𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝑐𝑐
ei
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
< 0, 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ej
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
< 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ej
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
< 0) and domestic output of the public firm in the foreign 
country (𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝑠𝑠
hi
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
< 0). However, it will increase not only the output of the public firm (𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hj
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
> 0) and the 
CSR-oriented firm (
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐hj
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
> 0) of the home country, but also the domestic output of the CSR-oriented 
firm in the foreign country (𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝑐𝑐
hi
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
> 0). On the other hand, from the viewpoint of country i which has a 
mixed market, imposing a higher tariff will decrease export outputs of all firms in both the countries 
(𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝑠𝑠
ei
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
< 0, 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ej
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
< 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ej
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
< 0) and domestic output of the public firm in the home country 
(𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝑠𝑠
hi
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
< 0). However, it will increase the outputs of the CSR-oriented firms in both the countries 
(𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝑐𝑐
hi
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
> 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐hj
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
> 0) and the output of the public firm in the foreign country only when the 
degree of CSR is high, that is, 
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hj
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
<
>
0 when 17 − 3𝛼𝛼(9 − 2𝛼𝛼) >< 0. 
The total market outputs and prices in each country are given by: 
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 87−41𝛼𝛼−(62−26𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−(1−2𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗3(43−33𝛼𝛼+6𝛼𝛼2)  and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 42−2𝛼𝛼(29−9𝛼𝛼)+(62−26𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+(1−2𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗3(43−33𝛼𝛼+6𝛼𝛼2) , 
𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 = 72−34𝛼𝛼+4(2+𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−(29−10𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗3(43−33𝛼𝛼+6𝛼𝛼2)  and 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 = 57−65𝛼𝛼+18𝛼𝛼2−4(2+𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+(29−10𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗3(43−33𝛼𝛼+6𝛼𝛼2) . 
                                       
8 Appendix (ii) demonstrates that a state-owned public firm in country i does not export at equilibrium, that is, 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ei = 0. Note 
that the sufficient conditions for positive outputs and prices in both the countries are 42 − 58𝛼𝛼 + 18𝛼𝛼2 + 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 − 2𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 <
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(2(−31 + 13𝛼𝛼)) < 87 − 41𝛼𝛼 − 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 + 2𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗  for country i and −57 + 65𝛼𝛼 − 18𝛼𝛼2 + 4(2 + 𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 < 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(29 − 10𝛼𝛼) < 2(36 − 17𝛼𝛼 +4𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 2𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) for country j, which are satisfied at equilibrium. 
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Note that 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
< 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
> 0, but 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
<
>
0 when 𝛼𝛼 <
>
0.5. This implies that imposing a higher tariff 
will reduce its domestic total market outputs in both the countries. As regards the total market output 
of the foreign country, a higher tariff in a mixed market will increase the total market output in a private 
market, but the effect of the tariff depends on the degree of CSR. In particular, as the degree of CSR 
increases, it first reduces and then raises the foreign country’s total market output in a mixed market. 
This asymmetry leads to domestic welfare in each country, as given by: 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴 = 1
18(43−33𝛼𝛼+6𝛼𝛼2)2 {11412 − 16104𝛼𝛼 + 6099𝛼𝛼2 + 206𝛼𝛼3 − 329𝛼𝛼4 + 4𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(591 − 1380𝛼𝛼 + 1225𝛼𝛼2 − 551𝛼𝛼3 +103𝛼𝛼4 − (3873 − 6254𝛼𝛼 + 3876𝛼𝛼2 − 1068𝛼𝛼3 + 113𝛼𝛼4)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) − 6828𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 + 2(𝛼𝛼(6039 − 3353𝛼𝛼 + 630𝛼𝛼2 − 16𝛼𝛼3) +(2172 − 3977𝛼𝛼 + 2849𝛼𝛼2 − 820𝛼𝛼3 + 76𝛼𝛼4)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 + (12057 − 18592𝛼𝛼 + 10280𝛼𝛼2 − 2432𝛼𝛼3 + 208𝛼𝛼4)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗2}, 
𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗
𝐴𝐴 = 1
18(43−33𝛼𝛼+6𝛼𝛼2)2 {9990 − 14616𝛼𝛼 + 5549𝛼𝛼2 + 326𝛼𝛼3 − 349𝛼𝛼4 + 2(4763 − 9064𝛼𝛼 + 5881𝛼𝛼2 − 1498𝛼𝛼3 +118𝛼𝛼4)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖2 + 2(3168 − 4435𝛼𝛼 + 2334𝛼𝛼2 − 595𝛼𝛼3 + 70𝛼𝛼4)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 − (14477 − 21164𝛼𝛼 + 11358𝛼𝛼2 − 2664𝛼𝛼3 +232𝛼𝛼4)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗2 − 2𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(954 − 3139𝛼𝛼 + 1498𝛼𝛼2 + 231𝛼𝛼3 − 160𝛼𝛼4) + (1282 − 2919𝛼𝛼 + 2271𝛼𝛼2 − 734𝛼𝛼3 + 88𝛼𝛼4)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗)}. 
Finally, from the first-order conditions for the maximization of 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 and 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴 with respect to 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 and 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 of each country, we have the following reaction functions: 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 2�591−1380𝛼𝛼+1225𝛼𝛼2−551𝛼𝛼3+103𝛼𝛼4�+�2172−3977𝛼𝛼+2849𝛼𝛼2−820𝛼𝛼3+76𝛼𝛼4�𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗4(3873−6254𝛼𝛼+3876𝛼𝛼2−1068𝛼𝛼3+113𝛼𝛼4) , 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 3168−4435𝛼𝛼+2334𝛼𝛼2−595𝛼𝛼3+70𝛼𝛼4−�14477−21164𝛼𝛼+11358𝛼𝛼2−2664𝛼𝛼3+232𝛼𝛼4�𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗(1282−2919𝛼𝛼+2271𝛼𝛼2−734𝛼𝛼3+88𝛼𝛼4) . 
Thus, the strategic tariff policies of the two countries are strategic complements, that is, 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
> 0. We 
have the following import tariffs at an asymmetric equilibrium: 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴∗ = 557970−1599798𝛼𝛼+1927869𝛼𝛼2−1276550𝛼𝛼3+490953𝛼𝛼4−102492𝛼𝛼5+8852𝛼𝛼6
5280516−12260718𝛼𝛼+11947797𝛼𝛼2−6221551𝛼𝛼3+1822344𝛼𝛼4−284940𝛼𝛼5+18592𝛼𝛼6
, 
𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
𝐴𝐴∗ = 2(553062−1214733𝛼𝛼+1110816𝛼𝛼2−538471𝛼𝛼3+145233𝛼𝛼4−20457𝛼𝛼5+1126𝛼𝛼6)
5280516−12260718𝛼𝛼+11947797𝛼𝛼2−6221551𝛼𝛼3+1822344𝛼𝛼4−284940𝛼𝛼5+18592𝛼𝛼6
. 
Note that 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴∗ > 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴∗𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 < 0; 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴∗ > 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴∗𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 > 0 when 𝑎𝑎 ∈ [0,1]. Further, 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴∗ > 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴∗ . 
Then, we have Lemma 7 as follows. 
LEMMA 7. In an asymmetric choice of privatization policy, the strategic tariff in a mixed market is 
lower than that in a private market, and it is decreasing (increasing) in 𝛼𝛼 in a mixed (private) market. 
It implies that in an asymmetric case with private and mixed markets, the strategic tariff is positive and 
thus, it can be directly used to reduce export from the foreign country’s firm. Further, strategic tariff in 
a mixed market is lower than that in a private market, but its difference depends on the degree of CSR. 
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The economic reasoning is as follows: For country i having a mixed market, the government can use 
the public firm and tariff policy as a substitute for CSR activities. Thus, it will reduce the tariff as the 
degree of CSR increases. This also implies that the tariff in a mixed market is substitutable with the 
degree of CSR. However, the government in country j, which has a private market, has no option besides 
the tariff policy. Thus, knowing that the other government in country i can reduce tariffs, but increase 
the production of the public firm as the degree of CSR increases, it will increase tariff to not only reduce 
the export from the foreign firm, but also increase the outputs of the public firm and the CSR-oriented 
firm of the home country. This implies that the tariff in a private market is complementary to the degree 
of CSR. Thus, it explains why the effect of CSR in an asymmetric case goes through differently between 
the countries. This contrasting effect indicates that the difference between strategic tariffs increases the 
degree of CSR increases in an asymmetric case. 
Finally, we have the domestic welfare in each country as follows: 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴∗ = (17901795619872 − 80628483326544𝛼𝛼 + 163844616810852𝛼𝛼2 − 197345348913120𝛼𝛼3 +155356209692196𝛼𝛼4 − 82806460427756𝛼𝛼5 + 29652301108887𝛼𝛼6 − 6625004287830𝛼𝛼7 + 649002319951𝛼𝛼8 +86319463860𝛼𝛼9 − 37365969600𝛼𝛼10 + 4890737104𝛼𝛼11 − 242562096𝛼𝛼12)/(2(5280516 − 12260718𝛼𝛼 +11947797𝛼𝛼2 − 6221551𝛼𝛼3 + 1822344𝛼𝛼4 − 284940𝛼𝛼5 + 18592𝛼𝛼6)2), 
𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗
𝐴𝐴∗ = (17644160443752 − 79870846773168𝛼𝛼 + 162575769868924𝛼𝛼2 − 195554213079156𝛼𝛼3 +153304314892444𝛼𝛼4 − 81174490282226𝛼𝛼5 + 28858701475687𝛼𝛼6 − 6453184755052𝛼𝛼7 + 685431248451𝛼𝛼8 +49457588632𝛼𝛼9 − 26301258816𝛼𝛼10 + 3292895488𝛼𝛼11 − 149082416𝛼𝛼12)/(2(5280516 − 12260718𝛼𝛼 +11947797𝛼𝛼2 − 6221551𝛼𝛼3 + 1822344𝛼𝛼4 − 284940𝛼𝛼5 + 18592𝛼𝛼6)2). 
Using a similar process, we can examine the efficient tariff to maximize global welfare, which is 
given by: 
W𝐴𝐴 = 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 + 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴 = 19(43−33𝛼𝛼+6𝛼𝛼2)2 {10701 − 15360𝛼𝛼 + 5824𝛼𝛼2 + 266𝛼𝛼3 − 339𝛼𝛼4 − (2983 − 3444𝛼𝛼 +1871𝛼𝛼2 − 638𝛼𝛼3 + 108𝛼𝛼4)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗�−246 + 1604𝛼𝛼 − 1019𝛼𝛼2 + 35𝛼𝛼3 + 54𝛼𝛼4 − (1210 − 1286𝛼𝛼 + 539𝛼𝛼2 − 116𝛼𝛼3 +12𝛼𝛼4)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗� + 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�228 + 𝛼𝛼�379 + 𝛼𝛼(8 − 3𝛼𝛼)(119 − 122𝛼𝛼)� + 2(445 − 529𝛼𝛼 + 289𝛼𝛼2 − 43𝛼𝛼3 − 6𝛼𝛼4)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗�}. 
The differentiation of W𝐴𝐴 with respect to it  and jt  yields the efficient import tariff as: 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 = 90+684𝛼𝛼+655𝛼𝛼2−451𝛼𝛼3+113𝛼𝛼4
2(1845−1242𝛼𝛼+691𝛼𝛼2−190𝛼𝛼3+35𝛼𝛼4) and 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 = 2547𝛼𝛼−518𝛼𝛼2+44𝛼𝛼3+101𝛼𝛼4−3422(1845−1242𝛼𝛼+691𝛼𝛼2−190𝛼𝛼3+35𝛼𝛼4). 
Note that 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 > 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 > 0; 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 <> 0 when 𝛼𝛼 <>  0.14 and 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 > 0. Then, we have Lemma 8 
as follows. 
LEMMA 8. In an asymmetric case, efficient tariff is increasing in 𝛼𝛼. However, it is always positive in 
a mixed market, but can be negative (positive) when 𝛼𝛼 is low (high) in a private market. 
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It implies that in the asymmetric case an efficient tariff depends on the degree of CSR. As the degree 
of CSR increases, efficient tariff increases to reduce the over-production effect of the CSR-oriented 
firm. Thus, efficient tariff in an asymmetric case is complementary to the degree of CSR.  
Finally, the maximized global welfare is given by: 
W𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 = 2376−1386𝛼𝛼+435𝛼𝛼2−34𝛼𝛼3−𝛼𝛼42(1845−1242𝛼𝛼+691𝛼𝛼2−190𝛼𝛼3+35𝛼𝛼4). 
PROPOSITION 4. In an asymmetric choice of privatization policy, strategic tariff is higher (low) than 
efficient tariff when the degree of CSR is low (high). 
Proof: Comparing the tariffs and global welfares in the case of both the markets, we can find: (i) 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴∗ ≥
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃  when 0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 0.24, and 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴∗ ≤ 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃  when 0.24 ≤ 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 1; (ii) 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴∗ ≥ 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃  when 0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼 ≤0.42 and 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴∗ ≤ 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃  when 0.42 ≤ 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 1; and (iii) W𝐴𝐴∗ = W𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃  when 𝛼𝛼 = 0.35 and W𝐴𝐴∗ < W𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃  
otherwise. 
5.2 Comparisons 
In the following, we compare the equilibrium outcomes under sequential choice of privatization with 
those under simultaneous choice. Figure 3 compares the strategic tariffs in the symmetric case, that is, 
private and mixed markets, to the asymmetric case. It indicates that asymmetric choice leads to the 
strategic tariff being higher in a private market, but lower in a mixed market. 
 
Figure 3. Comparison of Strategic Tariffs in the Symmetric and Asymmetric cases 
LEMMA 9. 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴∗ > 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃∗ > 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀∗ > 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴∗.  
Figure 4 compares the domestic welfare of both the countries in the symmetric and the asymmetric 
cases.  
17 
 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of Domestic Welfare in the Symmetric and the Asymmetric cases 
LEMMA 10. We have the following welfare ranks:   (𝑖𝑖) 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 ≥ 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 > 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 > 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴 when 0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 0.40   (𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 > 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 ≥ 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 > 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴 when 0.40 < 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 0.85  (𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 > 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 > 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 > 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴 when 0.85 < 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 1 
5.3 Endogenous Choice Game 
Finally, we consider a privatization choice game in a super game between the two countries. 
Table 1 describes the payoffs in a game with symmetric and asymmetric choices of privatization 
policy.  
Table 1．Privatization Choice Game 
Country i, j Nationalization Privatization 
Nationalization 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀∗, 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀∗ 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴∗, 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴∗ 
Privatization 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴∗, 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴∗ 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃∗, 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃∗ 
PROPOSITION 5. In a privatization choice game, nationalization policy in both the countries is the 
unique Nash equilibrium. 
Proof: Using the welfare ranks, we have 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀∗ = 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀∗ > 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴∗ and 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴∗ > 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃∗. Hence, 
there exists a unique Nash equilibrium where the governments of both the countries choose 
nationalization. 
PROPOSITION 6. Nationalization (Privatization) policy in both the countries is a Pareto-efficient 
outcome when the degree of CSR is low (high). 
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Proof: Comparing the results, we get 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀
>
<
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃 when 𝛼𝛼 <
>
0.81. 
This implies that when the degree of CSR is high, simultaneous choice of privatization policy in both 
the countries is globally optimal, while the equilibrium is the simultaneous choice of nationalization 
policy in both countries. Therefore, there is a prisoner’s dilemma in choosing privatization policy in the 
presence of higher CSR. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
We considered an international bilateral trade model with CSR and examined strategic tariffs and 
privatization policies. Our analysis and main findings are as follows: First, we analyzed symmetric 
choice of privatization policy and demonstrated that tariff policy has an entry-reducing effect and thus, 
the strategic tariff is positive and decreasing in the degree of CSR in a private market. We also 
demonstrated that the strategic tariff is higher (lower) than the efficient tariff when the degree of CSR 
is low (high). 
Second, we analyzed symmetric choice of nationalization policy and demonstrated that tariff 
policy is substitutable for the public firm, but the strategic tariff is increasing and then decreasing in the 
degree of CSR. We also demonstrated that the strategic tariff is higher (lower) than the efficient tariff 
when the degree of CSR is low (high).  
Third, we compared private and mixed markets under symmetric choice of privatization policy 
and demonstrated that strategic tariff is higher in a private market than that in a mixed market, while 
efficient tariff is lower in a private market than that in a mixed market. Thus, privatization will raise 
strategic tariff and worsen (improve) domestic welfare when the degree of CSR is low (high). 
Fourth, we investigated asymmetric choice of privatization policy and demonstrated that strategic 
tariff in a mixed market is lower in a mixed market than that in a private market. We also demonstrated 
that the strategic tariff is higher (low) than the efficient tariff when the degree of CSR is low (high) in 
both the markets.  
Finally, we examined the endogenous choice of privatization policy by the two countries and 
demonstrated that both the countries endogenously choose symmetric nationalization policy even 
though symmetric privatization policy in both the countries is globally optimal when the degree of CSR 
is high. Therefore, there is a prisoner’s dilemma problem in a privatization choice game within a 
bilateral trade framework with higher CSR. 
There are challenging issues for future study on the robustness of the outcomes under alternative 
scenarios such as various modes of competition like Bertrand competition and/or product differentiation, 
the number of private firms, and more general specifications of demand and cost functions between the 
firms.  
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Appendix. Proof of No Export of the Public Firm 
(i) Symmetric Mixed Market 
We first examine the symmetric mixed market case. For expositional convenience, we consider the 
symmetric case in which the CSR-oriented firms of both the countries have the same degree of CSR, 
that is, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼. Allowing boundary solutions for the public firm’s export output requires Kuhn-
Tucker conditions for the maximization problem. However, for the time being, we suppose that the 
optimal output for the public firm’s export output is zero. Then, the first-order conditions of the CSR-
oriented firm and the public firm of each country yield the following equilibrium outputs: 
𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐hi = 12(1+𝛼𝛼)+(1−𝛼𝛼)(29−6𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+(13+17𝛼𝛼−6𝛼𝛼2)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗24(4−𝛼𝛼) ,  
𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ei = 12(1+𝛼𝛼)−35𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗−(19−6𝛼𝛼)((1−𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗)24(4−𝛼𝛼) , 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hi = 36−17𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+18𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗−18𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗72 . 
The domestic welfare is: 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀 = 1
5184(4−𝛼𝛼)2 {1296(3 − 2𝛼𝛼)(7 + 2𝛼𝛼) − 5(6103 − 3254𝛼𝛼 + 508𝛼𝛼2)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖2 − 216(11 + 𝛼𝛼)(1 − 4𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 +5(3977 − 2434𝛼𝛼 + 284𝛼𝛼2)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗2 + 2𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�540(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(1 − 4𝛼𝛼) + �2237 − 2𝛼𝛼(863 + 44𝛼𝛼)�𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗�}. 
The differentiation of 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 with respect to it  yields the equilibrium import tariff: 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀 = 30(1−5𝛼𝛼+4𝛼𝛼2)
1571−808𝛼𝛼+146𝛼𝛼2
. 
Then, we can have the supposed equilibrium outputs as follows: 
𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hi = (4−𝛼𝛼)(389−86𝛼𝛼)2(1571−808𝛼𝛼+146𝛼𝛼2), 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐hi = 419+17𝛼𝛼(9+2𝛼𝛼)2(1571−808𝛼𝛼+146𝛼𝛼2), 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ei = 359+(453−206𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼2(1571−808𝛼𝛼+146𝛼𝛼2). 
Finally, we demonstrate that these equilibrium outputs satisfy the supposition that the optimal output 
of the public firm’s export output is zero. From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for maximizing the 
objective of the public firm, that is, 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ei ≥ 0, 𝜕𝜕𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ei ≤ 0 and 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ei. 𝜕𝜕𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ei = 0, the necessary condition 
for having a boundary solution for the public firm’s zero export output is as follows: 
𝜕𝜕𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ei
= 1 − 2𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ei − 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐hj − 3𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ei − 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hi − 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hj − 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 = − 3(1+𝛼𝛼)(389−86𝛼𝛼)3142−4𝛼𝛼(404−73𝛼𝛼) < 0. 
Therefore, the supposed equilibrium outputs indicate that the export output of the public firm is zero, 
that is, the public firm would not export at the equilibrium. 
(ii) Asymmetric Mixed Market 
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We examine the asymmetric case where country i has a mixed market while country j has a private 
market with the same degree of CSR, that is, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼. Using a similar procedure as in the previous 
proof, the first-order conditions of the CSR-oriented firm and the public firm in country i and the CSR-
oriented firm and the private firm in country j yield the following equilibrium outputs: 
𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hi = 105−𝛼𝛼(68−7𝛼𝛼)−2(4−𝛼𝛼)(7−8𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−(1+𝛼𝛼)(165𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗3(4−𝛼𝛼)(16−5𝛼𝛼) , 
𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐hi = 3+2(5−𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼+6(4−𝛼𝛼)(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+(16−5𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗(4−𝛼𝛼)(16−5𝛼𝛼) , 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ei = 14−𝛼𝛼−2𝛼𝛼2−4(4−𝛼𝛼)(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−(32−10𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗(4−𝛼𝛼)(16−5𝛼𝛼) , 
𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hj = 42−5(5−𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼+(4−𝛼𝛼)(4−5𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+(32−10𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗3(4−𝛼𝛼)(16−5𝛼𝛼) , 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ej = 9−5(5−𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼−2(4−𝛼𝛼)(7−5𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−(16−5𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗3(4−𝛼𝛼)(16−5𝛼𝛼) , 
𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐hj = 3�14−𝛼𝛼−2𝛼𝛼2�+(4−𝛼𝛼)(4+7𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+2(1−𝛼𝛼)(16−5𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗3(4−𝛼𝛼)(16−5𝛼𝛼) , 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ej = 9+6(5−𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼−2(4−𝛼𝛼)(7+4𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−(1−𝛼𝛼)(16−5𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗3(4−𝛼𝛼)(16−5𝛼𝛼) . 
The domestic welfare in each country is as follows: 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴 = 1
18(16−5𝛼𝛼)2(−4+𝛼𝛼)2 {25209 − 2𝛼𝛼(12693 − 2563𝛼𝛼 − 509𝛼𝛼2 + 140𝛼𝛼3) − 4(4 − 𝛼𝛼)2(487 − 262𝛼𝛼 + 25𝛼𝛼2)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖2 −(16 − 5𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗�2(357 − 454𝛼𝛼 + 112𝛼𝛼2 − 4𝛼𝛼3) − (16 − 5𝛼𝛼)(113 − 74𝛼𝛼 + 11𝛼𝛼2)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗� + 2(4 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�402 − 868𝛼𝛼 +655𝛼𝛼2 − 145𝛼𝛼3 + (16 − 5𝛼𝛼)(22 + 44𝛼𝛼 − 23𝛼𝛼2)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗�}, 
𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗
𝐴𝐴 = 1
18(16−5𝛼𝛼)2(−4+𝛼𝛼)2 {(22383 − 2𝛼𝛼(12048 − 2134𝛼𝛼 − 629𝛼𝛼2 + 152𝛼𝛼3) + 2(4 − 𝛼𝛼)2(542 − 440𝛼𝛼 +17𝛼𝛼2)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖2 − 2(4 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(258 − 1492𝛼𝛼 + 238𝛼𝛼2 + 17𝛼𝛼3 − 2(16 − 5𝛼𝛼)(13 − 34𝛼𝛼 + 10𝛼𝛼2)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗) + (16 − 5𝛼𝛼)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗(2(285 −292𝛼𝛼 + 158𝛼𝛼2 − 30𝛼𝛼3) + (16 − 5𝛼𝛼)(137 − 80𝛼𝛼 + 13𝛼𝛼2)𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗))}. 
The differentiation of 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 with respect to it  yields the equilibrium import tariff: 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴 = 15336−32406𝛼𝛼+29017𝛼𝛼2−10381𝛼𝛼3+1195𝛼𝛼4
2(133152−149532𝛼𝛼+63007𝛼𝛼2−12034𝛼𝛼3+880𝛼𝛼4), 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴 = 17676−23145𝛼𝛼+15467𝛼𝛼2−5132𝛼𝛼3+590𝛼𝛼4133152−149532𝛼𝛼+63007𝛼𝛼2−12034𝛼𝛼3+880𝛼𝛼4. 
Then, we can have the supposed equilibrium outputs as follows: 
𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hi = 69108−3𝛼𝛼(27101−10061𝛼𝛼+1107𝛼𝛼2+10𝛼𝛼3)133152−149532𝛼𝛼+63007𝛼𝛼2−12034𝛼𝛼3+880𝛼𝛼4,  
𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐hi = 13536+𝛼𝛼(4572−3628𝛼𝛼−1202𝛼𝛼2+365𝛼𝛼3)133152−149532𝛼𝛼+63007𝛼𝛼2−12034𝛼𝛼3+880𝛼𝛼4, 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ei = 18372−𝛼𝛼(3675+12064𝛼𝛼−6384𝛼𝛼2+830𝛼𝛼3)3675+12064𝛼𝛼−6384𝛼𝛼2+830𝛼𝛼3 , 
𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hj = 65424−𝛼𝛼(77468−39189𝛼𝛼+10023𝛼𝛼2−985𝛼𝛼3)133152−149532𝛼𝛼+63007𝛼𝛼2−12034𝛼𝛼3+880𝛼𝛼4, 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ej = 2532−𝛼𝛼(13651−6935𝛼𝛼+426𝛼𝛼2+105𝛼𝛼3)3675+12064𝛼𝛼−6384𝛼𝛼2+830𝛼𝛼3 , 
𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐hj = 65424−𝛼𝛼(49012−6167𝛼𝛼−2465𝛼𝛼2+475𝛼𝛼3)133152−149532𝛼𝛼+63007𝛼𝛼2−12034𝛼𝛼3+880𝛼𝛼4, 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ej = 2532+𝛼𝛼(23089−18456𝛼𝛼+3969𝛼𝛼2−230𝛼𝛼3)3675+12064𝛼𝛼−6384𝛼𝛼2+830𝛼𝛼3 . 
Finally, from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for maximizing the objective of the public firm, that is, 
𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ei ≥ 0, 𝜕𝜕𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ei ≤ 0 and 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ei. 𝜕𝜕𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ei = 0, the necessary condition for having a boundary solution for 
the public firm’s zero export output is as follows: 
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𝜕𝜕𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ei
= 1 − 2𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐ei − 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐hj − 3𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠ei − 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hi − 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠hj − 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 = − 3(18600−8502𝛼𝛼−6269𝛼𝛼2+4190𝛼𝛼3−575𝛼𝛼4)133152−149532𝛼𝛼+63007𝛼𝛼2−12034𝛼𝛼3+880𝛼𝛼4 < 0. 
Therefore, the supposed equilibrium outputs indicate that the export output of the public firm is zero, 
that is, the public firm would not export at equilibrium. 
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